dainkan: AA- A History Of Executive Missteps (article) ? Civil Aviation Forum ...

It seems I broked teh copyright rules earlier, so let's try this again:

"American Airlines has been in the news for weeks as labor battles boil over and the airline tries to recover from maintenance issues including loose seats on many of their jets that have forced additional flight cancellations. Rather than cite a breakdown in its maintenance program, American has issued statements laying the blame on everything from spilled soda-pop to seat design flaws; even in the absence of similar problems at other carriers. Many have begun asking, how all of these issues could be happening at an airline that was once considered one of the best?

Although the management at AA would like the public to believe that high labor costs are the main reason the airline has been losing altitude; American's fall from grace seems to have been inevitable regardless of labor costs given a pattern of management mistakes that appear to lack accountability or consequences for those who gave the orders. In fact, American's executives have had their decisions validated continuously with a perpetual flow of executive bonuses in a management culture that rewards the very activity that is dooming one of America's most historically successful companies. In fact, if and when American emerges from bankruptcy, however weak, AA executives stand to receive upwards of $600 million dollars..."

For the rest of the article:

http://www.examiner.com/article/amer....likes%22%7D&action_ref_map=%5B%5D

33 replies: All unread, showing first 25:

Mistakes are still mistakes even if they seemed "right" at the time.
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...here come the managment apologists to explain that, for instance, AA ignored a large airport in the nations's largest market, because conventional wisdom at the time was that no one can make a domestic hub at JFK. Better to give JFK and the purchased TWA place there to jetBlue and blame labour for AA's failures....

Quoting pu (Reply 1):
Mistakes are still mistakes even if they seemed "right" at the time.

Very true.

Nonetheless, several of the items the blog's author declares as AMR management's "mistakes" simply weren't, and made perfectly logical economic sense then and now. (Not to mention, of course, all the very smart things AMR management did over the same time frame covered in Mr. David's blog post which he fails to mention.)

But either way, any critiques of any mistakes have to be put in the context of information, or lack thereof. It's really easy to Monday morning quarterback given hindsight and far more information then was available at the time to the people responsible for making the decisions. Not saying that makes mistakes any less of mistakes - but that context is important.

Quoting pu (Reply 1):
here come the managment apologists

Yes - because anybody not towing the "AA management 100% to blame for the bad/AA unions 100% to credit for good" line is a "management apologist."

It's never that simple.

Quoting pu (Reply 1):
AA ignored a large airport in the nations's largest market, because conventional wisdom at the time was that no one can make a domestic hub at JFK.

Who ever suggested that? "Losing" JFK was a big strategic mistake - plain and simple. No question about it.

Quoting pu (Reply 1):
blame labour for AA's failures

As opposed to you blaming only management for AA's failures? Again - plenty of blame to go around.

[Edited 2012-10-10 16:49:58]

It's a solid article with a point to prove.

That said, a lot of these mistakes were sadly true.

Buying and dismantling 3 airlines was and is stupid.

The 757s to DL to compete on the same secondary routes out of JFK that AA wanted to start happens to be one of the DUMBEST moves I have seen in the industry EVER and makes AA largely irrelevant in a key cornerstone

How can you suggest there is "plenty" of blame to go around and yet argue that mainly mgmt should drive the future at AA?
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If labour is respnsible for so much of AA's wellbeing as claimed by those assigning labour blame, why should anyone listen mainly to mgmt when, by mnagement's own argument, labour's decisions are such a large part of the explanation for the condition of AA?
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If the blame is shared, so is the solution....if you want to own he solution then own the blame.

Quoting jfklganyc (Reply 4):
Buying and dismantling 3 airlines was and is stupid.

True.

Quoting jfklganyc (Reply 4):
The 757s to DL to compete on the same secondary routes out of JFK that AA wanted to start happens to be one of the DUMBEST moves I have seen in the industry EVER and makes AA largely irrelevant in a key cornerstone

Not in the slightest.

I continue to be amazed by how often this comes up. Offloading those expensive, non-standard TWA 757s was a very smart move. They were non-standard and superfluous to an airline that already had 100+ 757s in its fleet (all with the same engines, etc.). The mistake was not jumping on the 757s JFK-Europe bandwagon sooner, but AA didn't need TWA's 757s to do that - as evidenced by the fact that AA belatedly got around to putting 18 of its own 757s into service years later.

"Losing" JFK in general was a mistake. Not putting 757s on JFK-Europe sooner was a mistake. Getting rid of the TWA 757s was a very smart decision.

Quoting commavia (Reply 3):
But either way, any critiques of any mistakes have to be put in the context of information, or lack thereof. It's really easy to Monday morning quarterback given hindsight and far more information then was available at the time to the people responsible for making the decisions. Not saying that makes mistakes any less of mistakes - but that context is important.

This is a satisfactory EXPLANATION of AA management incorrectly used as JUSTIFICATION for bad decisions. There is a big difference.
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Everyone and every company on earth is judged by PAST performance and little else, the "hindsight is 20/20" argument is the excuse grabbed by failures who want to be judged only in the context of their incorrect assumptions at the time instead of the correct decisions made by competitors.
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Its a wonderful world where we are all judged by whether or not what we thought we were doing at the time was right, but the only way to judge what is and IS NOT good managemnt is by results, not by giving them credit for failed assumptions and a lack of information that competitors were mysteriously able to overcome.

Aaaaand we no longer need to read the article because it's wrong before it began. AA's management over the last decade has been tone deaf, uninspired, unfocused, etc, to be incredibly charitable. But if there was one theme to describe AA's yawning divergence from the other legacy carriers, it was its costs, and labor and fuel are the largest costs of any carrier. There is no "regardless of labor costs"; there is only "because of high labor costs" and "uncompetitive revenue production".

Quoting pu (Reply 1):
no one can make a domestic hub at JFK.

So far no one has other than B6; even B6 admits it's only a leisure carrier in NYC and that is on bare bones costs that AMR could never hope to match. DL's experience has been rough, moving most of the 'domestic hub' capacity to LGA and limiting JFK to international flights and their primary connections, and that setup is challenging, to say the very least.

Gailen David, the author of the article. http://www.examiner.com/airlines-in-miami/gailen-david

For full disclosure, he was fired by AA earlier this year for speaking out against management. (I'm not expressing an opinion pro or con against him).

This:

The Fokker 100 and McDonnell Douglas MD-11 were added to the AA fleet. Lemons anyone? While other major airlines submitted new aircraft orders to Airbus and Boeing; AA execs could not keep their eyes off Fokker and McDonnell Douglas. They chose one of the most passenger-unfriendly jets, the Fokker 100, for short haul routes and customers were greeted with tiny overhead bins, narrow cabins and dependability issues. These Fokker aircraft flew in American's system from 1992 to 2004 and customers hated every minute of it.

And instead, we're now stuck with even smaller RJs!

Quoting N62NA (Reply 9):
The Fokker 100 and McDonnell Douglas MD-11 were added to the AA fleet. Lemons anyone? While other major airlines submitted new aircraft orders to Airbus and Boeing; AA execs could not keep their eyes off Fokker and McDonnell Douglas. They chose one of the most passenger-unfriendly jets, the Fokker 100, for short haul routes and customers were greeted with tiny overhead bins, narrow cabins and dependability issues. These Fokker aircraft flew in American's system from 1992 to 2004 and customers hated every minute of it.

And instead, we're now stuck with even smaller RJs!

Boeing tried to work out a trade in deal to sell AA 75 717s to replace the F100s. That would have been good for everyone. Might have kept the 717 program alive and given AA and its passengers an outstanding airplane.

Good that the guy spoke out. I know another company in a related industry to AA that was horribly mismanaged for a real dark period from around 1995-2005. The results have spoken for themselves. I won't mention the company (cough, cough).

Until very recently, AA was a _very_ prestigious place for new MBA grads to work. Easily the most prestigious airline along with WN.

AA had a perfect storm of complacency. Arpey's complacency at the end w/r/t Jamie Baker's analyst call was a towering example of brain death IMO. Nice guy, but no idea what a crisis his shareholder equity was in (ultimately the equity evaporated -- the ultimate humiliation of the business world).

AA reminds me of GM's management and labor situation prior to 2008. Blind leading the blind and proudly! What's needed is a massive cultural change to rid AA of its failing past. Exec bonuses should be near the bottom of the Fortune 500, purely on a performance basis, and employee work rules should be very productive. AA has always had fine strategic options. It's time to have real thinkers there really take hold of AA's business opportunities. Such as running a rational, profitable airline. Start with that. But the signs aren't there.

[Edited 2012-10-10 18:34:13]

I have an MBA. I was a banker until I retired. MBA's are great at financial analysis and perhaps should run financial entities. Elsewhere they should run only the finance department.
.
Management by financial analysis, aka management by MBA, is what got AA into this mess.
Management by Bethune & Kelleher is ideal and speaks for itself.
The fact that Crandall has an MBA was probably a kiss of death for AA: they bought into the MBA hype.
BTW, Horton's MBA from SMU does not impress.

Quoting Flighty (Reply 11):
ut no idea what a crisis his shareholder equity was in (ultimately the equity evaporated -- the ultimate humiliation of the business world).

Yes.
Once bankruptcy enters the mind of management and the board, the interests of the shareholders are in danger. The board and mgmt starts self-serving behavior versus protecting the real owners of the company.
.

Quoting Flighty (Reply 11):
It's time to have real thinkers there really take hold of AA's business opportunities

Amen.
I'd hire about half of them from mid-level into AA's management team among those who have real OPERATIONAL experience at the airline and hire the rest from outside AA, and a few from outside the industry.
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This management team is still preaching the same old broken formula and using labour entirely as a scapegoat.

Hilarious, isn't it? It's the Examiner, it's Gailen David, and yet some people took it seriously.

(Want to bet this guy doesn't even have a college education, but somehow being a FA at AA makes him an authority on the airline business. LOL.)

Quoting LDVAviation (Reply 13):
Hilarious, isn't it? It's the Examiner, it's Gailen David, and yet some people took it seriously.

(Want to bet this guy doesn't even have a college education, but somehow being a FA at AA makes him an authority on the airline business. LOL.)

Well...... I was kind of reluctant to express an opinion on him pro/con, but I do want to make it clear that I don't happen to share your opinion as you expressed it above.

I think it would be more productive to stick to the content of the article.

Quoting commavia (Reply 3):

Yes - because anybody not towing the "AA management 100% to blame for the bad/AA unions 100% to credit for good" line is a "management apologist."

....thats normally the game you play.
like it or not I have never seen a Management team that was lacking common sense (and never seen so many people stick up for their stupidity)
If they would have said no to the bonuses (that didn't cost the company money....and all the other PR management line your about to say) they likely would have been able to have more labor peace. Instead they took the bonuses and basically shot labor a bird.
Why do you think the Delta employees love Gerry Grinstein? Its pretty simple. Ever single time employees took a pay cut he took one. did it hurt him? nope. Is he still rich? yep....but he took a little less money because he isn't a greedy idiot. Over time some of the best labor/management relationships always start with the CEO who is willing to give when times are bad.

He gave his pension/stock to the employee care fund....when has anyone at AA done this? You think Tom Horton is going to be hurting for money.....ever? no. He is just greedy. He lacks people skills. (and so does the rest of his people.)
Ok now for your management reply.....

Quoting commavia (Reply 6):
Offloading those expensive, non-standard TWA 757s was a very smart move.

expensive? your kidding me right? It was one of the few times Management was able to work with labor to find a viable way to keep them around. Having Delta do the PW2000 overhauls....in exchange for Delta's Trent 800 overhauls made them very close to the same cost as the AA fleet. Not buying that sorry. (I don't blame them for dumping them though. Thye dumped them due to to much capacity....cost wasn't the *real* issue.)

Quoting Deltal1011man (Reply 15):
....thats normally the game you play.
like it or not I have never seen a Management team that was lacking common sense (and never seen so many people stick up for their stupidity)
If they would have said no to the bonuses (that didn't cost the company money....and all the other PR management line your about to say) they likely would have been able to have more labor peace. Instead they took the bonuses and basically shot labor a bird.
Why do you think the Delta employees love Gerry Grinstein? Its pretty simple. Ever single time employees took a pay cut he took one. did it hurt him? nope. Is he still rich? yep....but he took a little less money because he isn't a greedy idiot. Over time some of the best labor/management relationships always start with the CEO who is willing to give when times are bad.

I am not defending the stock options.

I believe it is highly disingenuous for the unions to have displayed such faux shock and outrage at them, seeing as the unions were there when the stock option plan was created, and indeed actively and vocally supported the plan as aligning management's compensation with the interests of AA employees who each received several hundred to several thousand stock options themselves. It is also simply factually inaccurate to state - as many often do - that AA somehow "took" money from labor and "gave" it to management in the form of the stock option incentive compensation. That's not how stock options work.

Nonetheless - contrary to what you (and apparently some others) seem to be expecting from me (a "management apologist"), I do not disagree with your assessment that regardless of what anybody might think about the efficacy of the stock options, the optics of them were awful, and in the long-run the net benefit would have been far greater to simply forego them.

Quoting Deltal1011man (Reply 15):
expensive? your kidding me right? It was one of the few times Management was able to work with labor to find a viable way to keep them around. Having Delta do the PW2000 overhauls....in exchange for Delta's Trent 800 overhauls made them very close to the same cost as the AA fleet. Not buying that sorry. (I don't blame them for dumping them though. Thye dumped them due to to much capacity....cost wasn't the *real* issue.)

Yes. Expensive. Opportunity cost.

The opportunity cost of keeping those non-standard jets in the fleet, any engine maintenance arrangement with Delta notwithstanding, given that AA already had tons of standard 757s in its own fleet that were capable of operating the same missions for relatively little difference in conversion cost, given the gains in efficiency and operational flexibility from having as standardized a fleet as possible, and given that RR would likely have tried to steer Delta to send the Trent overhaul work to TAESL with or without an AA 757 overhaul quid pro quo, means that those jets were too expensive. It was a smart decision to get rid of them. It was not, however, a smart decision for AA to not follow through with the conversion of its own 757s for overwater missions for several years after that - delaying that move cost AA a huge opportunity to get the jump on Delta at JFK.

I'm not disputing that AMR management screwed up regarding the 757s to Europe. But the screw up was not the TWA 757s.

[Edited 2012-10-10 21:02:36]

Quoting pu (Reply 12):
The fact that Crandall has an MBA was probably a kiss of death for AA: they bought into the MBA hype.

Crandall was an airline man through and through. He was not an MBA hack.

Quoting commavia (Reply 15):
I believe it is highly disingenuous for the unions to have displayed such faux shock and outrage at them, seeing as the unions were there when the stock option plan was created, and indeed actively and vocally supported the plan as aligning management's compensation with the interests of AA employees who each received several hundred to several thousand stock options themselves. It is also simply factually inaccurate to state - as many often do - that AA somehow "took" money from labor and "gave" it to management in the form of the stock option incentive compensation. That's not how stock options work.

I don't really disagree. The issue is it was stupid(which you agree). Right or wrong from the money side....it was stupid. After they did that I had a hard time feeling bad when the Unions told them to shove it. (I would have too).

I still think nothing will be better till AA dumps most of its upper level. Its truly sad that the unions would rather deal with the mess that is US(and Doug Parker....smh) than it would deal with its own upper management. The fast the BOD see this, and makes changes to fix this, the faster things will get better. If they keep things the way they are.....well BK contracts don't last forever. (and the APA has already shown that they don't care....I personally believe most wouldn't lose any sleep if they shut the company down. That is a big big issue.)

*note I'm talking about the vote to strike and the 95%+ no vote on the LBO.*

Quoting commavia (Reply 15):
and given that RR would likely have tried to steer Delta to send the Trent overhaul work to TAESL with or without an AA 757 overhaul quid pro quo,

maybe, maybe not. Its likely the T800s would go to TAESL, but Delta has no problem sending engines (or aircraft *sigh*) overseas.

Quoting commavia (Reply 15):
It was not, however, a smart decision for AA to not follow through with the conversion of its own 757s for overwater missions for several years after that - delaying that move cost AA a huge opportunity to get the jump on Delta at JFK.

I don't disagree.

Quoting commavia (Reply 15):
iven that AA already had tons of standard 757s in its own fleet that were capable of operating the same missions for relatively little difference in conversion cost, given the gains in efficiency and operational flexibility from having as standardized a fleet as possible,

same as above. I just don't believe it was true cost. AA wanted to dump some capacity and that was an easy target. (along with the A300s) I do believe they pissed a great thing away in NYC and I'm not sure how they can change it at this point.

While some of it is spot on there things said about AA in the article that could be applied to most airlines. Other things are just factually inaccurate.

"Instead of placing orders for the Boeing 777 as most of the leading airlines in the world were doing at the time, AA opted for the DC-10 'wannabee' version of a next-generation airliner to carry it into the mid to late nineties. The MD-11 went into service from 1991 to 2002 and they were known for mechanical issues that regularly caused lengthy delays and cancellations. American eventually placed orders for the Boeing 777 behind many other carriers and took delivery of the first MD-11 replacement in 1999; six years after the 777 had been introduced at other carriers."

When the MD-11 was ordered by AA the 777 had not yet been offered up to the airlines. AA needed an aircraft with the range that MD said it was going to have. Could anyone have foreseen the issues the MD-11 was going to have? Once it became apparent that the 11 was not the right aircraft notice how quickly it left the fleet. And what airline operated the 777 in 1993?

Quoting N62NA (Reply 8):
The Fokker 100 and McDonnell Douglas MD-11 were added to the AA fleet. Lemons anyone? While other major airlines submitted new aircraft orders to Airbus and Boeing; AA execs could not keep their eyes off Fokker and McDonnell Douglas. They chose one of the most passenger-unfriendly jets, the Fokker 100, for short haul routes and customers were greeted with tiny overhead bins, narrow cabins and dependability issues. These Fokker aircraft flew in American's system from 1992 to 2004 and customers hated every minute of it.

And instead, we're now stuck with even smaller RJs!

AA ordered the F100 to operate on routes that were too long to operate an ATR 72 on, but not enough traffic to justify an MD-80 or 727-200. The aircraft were intended for routes like ORD-FAR and RDU-DAB. If it had been a choice between an F100 nonstop, or a connecting flight on two prop aircraft, passengers would have loved the F100, in much the same way passengers loved CRJs when they opened up nonstops that previously had not been flown, despite the CRJ's paperback book sized windows, low ceilings, and shoebox sized overhead bins.

However, the aircraft were originally intended to be flown with lower cost B scale crews. The end of the B scale made the economies of the F100 a lot less favorable, and meant that aircraft in the F100's size range had to be flown by even lower paid American Eagle crews to be profitable.

AA's most glaring fleet problem is that they don't have an F100 sized aircraft in their fleet. If AA had somehow been able to agree with their unions for wage rates low enough to make the F100 (or the 717) profitable when flown with mainline crews, AA would have been able to keep the F100s and / or 717s, which would have meant more jobs for AA mainline pilots and flight attendants, and put AA in a stronger competitive position vs its rivals.

Quoting N62NA (Reply 13):
I think it would be more productive to stick to the content of the article

...which is mostly terrible, regardless of the source.

Quoting MD-90 (Reply 16):
Crandall was an airline man through and through. He was not an MBA hack.

Crandall had a commanding knowledge of all aspects of the business - including not just finance, but also the operation - than most other executives of any company, in any industry.

Quoting Deltal1011man (Reply 17):
I just don't believe it was true cost. AA wanted to dump some capacity and that was an easy target. (along with the A300s)

I disagree.

AA was in capacity-reduction mode. Given that - which made more sense to offload? A small fleet of non-standard jets with not-inexpensive lease rates or a bunch of owned, sunk-cost jets with basically the exact same capabilities and standard engines and configurations?

Quoting Deltal1011man (Reply 17):
I do believe they pissed a great thing away in NYC and I'm not sure how they can change it at this point.

I do not disagree that "losing" JFK was the biggest strategic failure of AA management in the last decade. Huge, huge mistake.

Quoting LMP737 (Reply 18):
When the MD-11 was ordered by AA the 777 had not yet been offered up to the airlines. AA needed an aircraft with the range that MD said it was going to have. Could anyone have foreseen the issues the MD-11 was going to have? Once it became apparent that the 11 was not the right aircraft notice how quickly it left the fleet. And what airline operated the 777 in 1993?

Exactly.

I suppose one could argue - although the author isn't - that AA management's mistake was not waiting a few more years until the 777 came along, but either way, the MD11s on paper filled a need AA had, and thus AA purchased them. (MD, at that point already in decline, also gave AA a good deal.) However, on the flip side, once AA management - Crandall at that point - saw that the MD11 didn't live up to its billing, they immediately cancelled remaining outstanding orders and subsequently moved to the 777. And, in retrospect, it turned out working out well for AA that they waited several years to buy the 777 - they were able to get the IGW variant as opposed to the less-capable early 777-200s that United, BA, etc. got.

Quoting WA707atMSP (Reply 19):
AA ordered the F100 to operate on routes that were too long to operate an ATR 72 on, but not enough traffic to justify an MD-80 or 727-200. The aircraft were intended for routes like ORD-FAR and RDU-DAB. If it had been a choice between an F100 nonstop, or a connecting flight on two prop aircraft, passengers would have loved the F100, in much the same way passengers loved CRJs when they opened up nonstops that previously had not been flown, despite the CRJ's paperback book sized windows, low ceilings, and shoebox sized overhead bins.

Exactly.

I think history has shown that buying a 97-seat jet - in and of itself - was not a mistake in the slightest. And I doubt the passengers who got to fly on F100s as opposed to ATRs back in those days were complaining much given the choice.

If anything, I think AA's mistake was keeping the F100s as long as they did given the spiraling costs once Fokker went out of business, etc. AA may well have been served by buying 717s sooner, or maybe even getting in early on the E190 once they came around. But - again - that would have always been a challenge given the cost pressures (labor and otherwise) that AA faced on an aircraft of that size.

Quoting WA707atMSP (Reply 19):
AA's most glaring fleet problem is that they don't have an F100 sized aircraft in their fleet. If AA had somehow been able to agree with their unions for wage rates low enough to make the F100 (or the 717) profitable when flown with mainline crews, AA would have been able to keep the F100s and / or 717s, which would have meant more jobs for AA mainline pilots and flight attendants, and put AA in a stronger competitive position vs its rivals.

Agreed. The 100-seater is critical. AA needs one - badly - and has for almost a decade. They also need competitive labor costs to make a fleet that size viable. This is really, to me, the crux and pivot of the entire scope issue between AA and the APA - and I continue to believe that a compromise solution can be found if both sides want one.

Quoting commavia (Reply 21):
Quoting LMP737 (Reply 18):
When the MD-11 was ordered by AA the 777 had not yet been offered up to the airlines. AA needed an aircraft with the range that MD said it was going to have. Could anyone have foreseen the issues the MD-11 was going to have? Once it became apparent that the 11 was not the right aircraft notice how quickly it left the fleet. And what airline operated the 777 in 1993?

Exactly.

The article neglects to mention that DL ordered and took delivery of their MD-11s around the same time as AA, and like AA switched to 777s after the MD-11 failed to meet expectations.

UA seriously considered buying MD-11s at the same time AA and DL did, but UA was in such disarray in the mid-late 1980s that they were not able to place their DC-10 replacement order until after the 777 became an option. Had there been less turmoil at UA at the time the MD-11 was launched, UA probably would have ordered it, too.

Even if every other bankrupt airline also ordered the MD-11 (or made as a group any other bad decision) how does this lead to any conclusion but that the bankrupt airlines were unified in bad decisions?

The convergent thinkingof US legacy airline leadership is being offered as an excuse for failure. Repeatedly.

The fact that the legacy airlines attract subpar managers locked into the mindset that decisions are right whenever they match what competitors also decided does not have to extend to critical evaluations of management's performance.

Results matter, not comformity to the conventional wisdom of bankrupt competitors.

[Edited 2012-10-11 10:48:06]

[Edited 2012-10-11 10:48:54]

Quoting pu (Reply 23):

Even if every other bankrupt airline also ordered the MD-11 (or made as a group any other bad decision) how does this lead to any conclusion but that the bankrupt airlines were unified in bad decisions?

What would have been a better decision? A340s? 744s?

25 WA707atMSP: The bankrupt airlines were, as you put it, "unified in bad decisions" ONLY because a bad decision (buying the MD-11) was the best decision open to th

26 LDVAviation: Productive, how? The content is not presented in a factual and rational manner. Now, I must admit I wasted my time reading it. Had I simply taken not

27 LDVAviation: Isn't the answer obvious? The better decision would have been the as yet, undesigned Boeing 797.

29 pu: . My primary point is not whether the MD11 or any other decision by AA mgmt was good or bad, but rather: 1. The fact that bankrupt competitors make (

30 Bobloblaw: Does AA have as higher CASM than their competitors or not?

31 LDVAviation: Minus labor and fuel, they have a lower CASM than US Airways. I forget how it compares to United and Delta.

32 tommy767: This is actually a very well written article. AA is the king of missteps. And I would think for most people on this forum it's a mystery as to why AA

33 commavia: How was that a mistake??? You and I have discussed this before on other threads. I am still perplexed by this fixation of many on the allegedly "bad

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AA- A History Of Executive Missteps (article) ? Civil Aviation Forum ...

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